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Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission: NEXUS APPROACH 
ADOPTED WHEN GOVERNMENT 
ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT LAND 
DEVELOPMENT 
When a state or local government 
imposes a condition on the new develop-
ment of land, there must be a substantial 
nexus between that condition and some 
injury to the public interest caused by the 
development. This new "nexus" approach 
in land-use regulation was recently 
announced by the Supreme Court in Nol· 
Ian v. California Coastal Commission, __ 
U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
The Nollans owned a beachfront lot on 
the Pacific Ocean, improved with a small 
bungalow. Originally, the Nollans leased 
the property with an option to buy. The 
option to buy was conditioned on their 
tearing down the bungalow and replacing 
it. In order to meet this condition, the 
Nollans were required to obtain a coastal 
permit from the California Coastal Com-
mission. Consequently, they asked the 
commission for permission to tear down 
the bungalow and replace it with a three-
bedroom house. The commission granted 
the request, but only on the condition that 
the Nollans grant a permanent easement 
allowing the public to walk across a por-
tion of their beach, which was located 
between two public beaches. 
The Nollans filed a petition for writ of 
administrative mandamus in the Superior 
Court of Ventura County asking it to 
invalidate the easement condition. They 
argued that the condition could not be 
imposed unless there was evidence to prove 
that their development of the land would 
adversely affect public access to the beach. 
The court agreed and remanded the case 
back to the commission for a hearing. 
After the hearing, the commission reaf-
firmed its initial imposition of the condi-
tion, citing various justifications for their 
restriction on the development permit. 
The commission reasoned that the new 
house would block the publics' view of the 
ocean, therefore leading to the develop-
ment of a "wall of residential structures 
that would prevent the public psycholo-
gically ... from realizing a stretch of 
coastline exists that they have every right 
to visit." Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44. Fur-
thermore, the commission believed that 
the new house would also increase private 
use ofthe beach. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144. 
In essence, the commission stated that 
these purported visual and psychological 
access problems resulting from the con-
struction of the house, along with future 
development in the area would result in a 
severe restriction of the publics' ability to 
traverse to and along the beaches. Id. Con-
sequently, the commission concluded that 
they were justified in requiring the Nol-
lans to offset these burdens by providing 
public access to the beaches in the form of 
an easement across their property. 
In response to the commission's deci-
sion, the Nollans filed a supplemental peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus with the 
Superior Court of Ventura County. In the 
petition, they argued that the imposition 
of the easement condition violated the 
takings clause of the fifth amendment, as 
applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Id. The court agreed 
with the Nollans, finding that the Califor-
nia Coastal Act of 1976 authorized the 
commission to impose public access condi-
tions on development permits only where 
the development would adversely affect 
public access to the beach. Id. In the 
court's view, the record did not provide 
sufficient evidence to conclude that 
replacement of the bungalow with a house 
would directly and adversely affect public 
access to the ocean. Ii The commission 
appealed and the California Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding no statutory or 
constitutional issues ~hich would prohibit 
the access condition on the Nollans' devel-
opment permit. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. 
The Nollans appealed this decision to the 
United States Supreme Court, raising only 
the taking issue. 
The question, therefore, before the 
Supreme Court was whether the public 
access condition placed on the Nollans' 
coastal permit violated the takings clause. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia 
announced what was in effect a new doc-
trine in land-use regulation. When the 
state imposes a condition on new develop-
ment, he said, there must be a substantial 
nexus between that condition and some 
injury to the public interest caused by the 
development. Had the state ordered the 
Nollans to grant the easement rights 
directly, Scalia explained, this would have 
constituted a taking. Id. But conditioning 
the Nollans' rebuilding permit on their 
granting of an easement would be a lawful 
land-use regulation if it substantially fur-
thered governmental purposes that would 
justify denial of the permit. Nolan, 107 S. 
Ct. at 3146. 
Justice Scalia conceded that it was possi-
ble to identify harms that might flow from 
the Nollans' development ofthe property, 
such as blocking the public's view of the 
beach. But he could not find a sufficient 
relationship between such a harm and the 
award of additional public-access rights to 
the beach behind the Nollans' house. 
Therefore, the commission's imposition of 
the easement condition was not a valid 
exercise of land-use power, and was in 
effect a "taking," since the condition did 
not serve public purposes related to the 
permit requirement. 
Four justices, led by Justice Brennan, dis-
sented. The dissenters noted that the 
Court had long held that the state need 
only show a rational relationship between 
the regulation and a public interest, when 
challenging the exercise of police power 
under due process or equal protection 
clauses. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151. The 
majority's new nexus requirement was not 
consistent, in their opinion, with this gen-
eral understanding. In effect, the majority 
was applying a heightened scrutiny in 
examining the exercise of the state's police 
power under the takings clause. Nolan, 107 
S. Ct. at 3152-53. The dissent would have 
given much more deference to the legisla-
ture by retaining the less stringent "ration-
al relationship" standard. 
The dissent was accurate in noting the 
novelty of the result in Nollan. But con- / 
trary to the dissent's opinion, this nexus 
approach is a good one. State and local 
government officials will no longer be able 
to demand that developers provide various 
benefits to the community which are 
remotely related to their development 
project. Furthermore, the government will 
no longer be able to coerce a property 
owner into conferring benefits on the gen-
eral public, when they have done nothing 
that would justify singling them out for 
such a restriction. 
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